Curveball

[TonyM]

WASHINGTON

In late 2002, two strong-willed CIA officers, identified only as Beth and Margaret, were at daggers drawn. They had diametrically opposing views about the veracity of an Iraqi defector's reports concerning Saddam Hussein's biological weapons programs, and especially the notorious but never seen mobile weapons labs.

"Look," said Beth defiantly, "we can validate a lot of what this guy says."

Margaret, angry and incredulous: "Where did you validate it?"

Beth: "On the Internet."

Margaret: "Exactly, it's on the Internet. That's where he got it too!"

Margaret was right in that episode, recounted in the new book Curveball by Bob Drogin of the Los Angeles Times. Curveball was the code name of the Iraqi defector in Germany on whose reports the Bush administration relied heavily in its argument that Saddam's weapons of mass destruction justified a preventive war.

In 1999, Curveball defected to Germany, which has a significant portion of the Iraqi diaspora. Seeking the good life - a prestigious job, a Mercedes - he jumped to the head of the line of asylum-seekers and got the attention of Germany's intelligence agency with the word biowaffen, germ weapons. He claimed to have been deeply involved in Saddam's sophisticated and deadly science, particularly those notorious mobile labs. Notorious and, we now know, nonexistent.

German intelligence officials - partly because they thought Germany had been unfairly blamed for not detecting the Hamburg cell from which three of the four 9/11 pilots came - refused to allow U.S. officials to interview Curveball. Yet by March 2001, the Germans were expressing doubts about him; by April 2002, the British were too.

So were some U.S. officials. But others became invested in Curveball's credibility and soon they could not back down without risking personal mortification and institutional disgrace - both of which came, of course, after the invasion. Then some of Curveball's Iraqi acquaintances were located and identified him as a "congenital liar" who was not a scientist but a taxi driver. But before the invasion, he supplied an important rationale for launching it: He was the most important source for Colin Powell's 80-minute address to the U.N. Security Council detailing Iraq's WMD programs, the address that solidified American support for war.

Drogin's account of the search for WMDs after Baghdad fell would be hilarious were the implications not tragic. That missile spotted by analysts of satellite imagery? It was a rotating steel drum for drying corn. The missile photographed from the air? Chickens in Iraq are raised in long, low half-cylinder coops.

Drogin probably overstates his indictment of U.S. officials when he says that the CIA, having failed to "connect the dots" prior to 9/11, "made up the dots" on Iraq's WMDs. In the next paragraph his assessment is less sinister but more alarming because itsuggests the problem was human nature. Calling Curveball a fabricator, Drogin writes, "implied that U.S. intelligence had fallen for a clever hoax. The truth was more disturbing. The defector didn't con the spies so much as they conned themselves."

Drogin's book arrivesas some Washington voices are reprising a familiar theme: Iran's nuclear program is near a fruition that justifies preventive military action. Whether or not these voices should be heeded, Drogin's book explains one reason why they will not be.

[netwrangler]

WASHINGTON

In late 2002, two strong-willed CIA officers, identified only as Beth and Margaret, were at daggers drawn. They had diametrically opposing views about the veracity of an Iraqi defector's reports concerning Saddam Hussein's biological weapons programs, and especially the notorious but never seen mobile weapons labs.

"Look," said Beth defiantly, "we can validate a lot of what this guy says."

Margaret, angry and incredulous: "Where did you validate it?"

Beth: "On the Internet."

Margaret: "Exactly, it's on the Internet. That's where he got it too!"

Margaret was right in that episode, recounted in the new book Curveball by Bob Drogin of the Los Angeles Times. Curveball was the code name of the Iraqi defector in Germany on whose reports the Bush administration relied heavily in its argument that Saddam's weapons of mass destruction justified a preventive war.

In 1999, Curveball defected to Germany, which has a significant portion of the Iraqi diaspora. Seeking the good life - a prestigious job, a Mercedes - he jumped to the head of the line of asylum-seekers and got the attention of Germany's intelligence agency with the word biowaffen, germ weapons. He claimed to have been deeply involved in Saddam's sophisticated and deadly science, particularly those notorious mobile labs. Notorious and, we now know, nonexistent.

German intelligence officials - partly because they thought Germany had been unfairly blamed for not detecting the Hamburg cell from which three of the four 9/11 pilots came - refused to allow U.S. officials to interview Curveball. Yet by March 2001, the Germans were expressing doubts about him; by April 2002, the British were too.

So were some U.S. officials. But others became invested in Curveball's credibility and soon they could not back down without risking personal mortification and institutional disgrace - both of which came, of course, after the invasion. Then some of Curveball's Iraqi acquaintances were located and identified him as a "congenital liar" who was not a scientist but a taxi driver. But before the invasion, he supplied an important rationale for launching it: He was the most important source for Colin Powell's 80-minute address to the U.N. Security Council detailing Iraq's WMD programs, the address that solidified American support for war.

Drogin's account of the search for WMDs after Baghdad fell would be hilarious were the implications not tragic. That missile spotted by analysts of satellite imagery? It was a rotating steel drum for drying corn. The missile photographed from the air? Chickens in Iraq are raised in long, low half-cylinder coops.

Drogin probably overstates his indictment of U.S. officials when he says that the CIA, having failed to "connect the dots" prior to 9/11, "made up the dots" on Iraq's WMDs. In the next paragraph his assessment is less sinister but more alarming because itsuggests the problem was human nature. Calling Curveball a fabricator, Drogin writes, "implied that U.S. intelligence had fallen for a clever hoax. The truth was more disturbing. The defector didn't con the spies so much as they conned themselves."

Drogin's book arrivesas some Washington voices are reprising a familiar theme: Iran's nuclear program is near a fruition that justifies preventive military action. Whether or not these voices should be heeded, Drogin's book explains one reason why they will not be.A sad commentary indeed.

The following quote, from the LA Times' review of Drogin's book, brought back other memories for me:
...Curveball was lying. Worse, Drogin shows, many people who doubted him, including some at high levels in the U.S. government, didn't seem to care. He gave them "evidence" for a theory they already believed and became the needed spark for a war they'd already planned.Several studies, at least some of them sincere, have looked into whether the intelligence analysis prior to the Iraq War was 'rigged' — whether, in fact, the analysts were told what result to bring back.

All of the studies concluded that there was no evidence of a 'directed verdict'. Of course, lack of evidence of a deed is not the same as proof that the deed did not take place. But that's not the point.

During my years as an analyst, I realized that there were basically two kinds of managers:

those who wanted the truth — an unbiased report
those who wanted '"evidence" for a theory they already believed.'

If you were smart enough to be an analyst, you were smart enough to figure out what kind of manager you had.

One of the saddest experiences for an analyst is to see hard won data misused by the folks at higher levels. Usually, your only recourse was to ask, "How do I transfer out of this CS outfit?" :(

I wonder how many intelligence analysts wanted a transfer prior to the Iraq War.

I am planning to read Drogin's book — as painful as that experience might be.